This study investigates whether corporate social responsibility (CSR) mitigates or contributes to stock price crash risk. Crash risk, defined as the conditional skewness of return distribution, captures asymmetry in risk and is important for investment decisions and risk management. If socially responsible firms commit to a high standard of transparency and engage in less bad news hoarding, they would have lower crash risk. However, if managers engage in CSR to cover up bad news and divert shareholder scrutiny, CSR would be associated with higher crash risk. Our findings support the mitigating effect of CSR on crash risk. We find that firms' CSR performance is negatively associated with future crash risk after controlling for other predictors of crash risk. The result holds after we account for potential endogeneity. Moreover, the mitigating effect of CSR on crash risk is more pronounced when firms have less effective corporate governance or a lower level of institutional ownership. The results are consistent with the notion that firms that actively engage in CSR also refrain from bad news hoarding behavior and thus reducing crash risk. This role of CSR is particularly important when governance mechanisms, such as monitoring by boards or institutional investors, are weak.
Introduction
In recent years, corporate social responsibility (CSR) has emerged as a dominant theme in the business world. Many companies have expressed CSR commitments, initiated CSR projects, established CSR committees, and issued CSR reports. As CSR becomes a mainstream business activity, it is being promoted as a core area of management, next to marketing, accounting, or finance (Crane et al., 2008) . In response to the rising popularity of CSR in practice, there is a growing multidisciplinary literature on CSR and its impact on firm actions and outcomes. A large number of studies have investigated the link between corporate social performance and corporate financial performance (e.g., Roman et al., 1999; Margolis and Walsh, 2001; Jiao, 2010; Kim and Statman, 2012) . Other studies examine the association between CSR and firm risk (e.g., Lee and Faff, 2009) . Some recent studies investigate the association between CSR and cost of capital (e.g., El Ghoul et al., 2011; Dhaliwal et al., 2011; Goss and Roberts, 2011) .
In this study, we examine the relation between CSR and firm-specific stock price crash risk. Following Chen et al. (2001) , we define crash risk as the conditional skewness of return distribution, rather than the likelihood of extreme negative returns.
1 Conditional skewness, like mean and median, is an important characteristic of return distribution. Unlike prior studies that focus on stock performance and firm risk, which capture the mean (first moment) and variance (second moment) of return distribution, we focus on conditional skewness, the third moment of return distribution. Crash risk captures asymmetry in risk, especially downside risk, thus is 1 Chen et al. (2001) warn that (p. 348): "Thus, when we speak of 'forecasting crashes' in the title of the paper, we are adopting a narrow and euphemistic definition of the word 'crashes,' associating it solely with the conditional skewness of the return distribution; we are not in the business of forecasting negative expected returns." Chen et al. point out that this definition follows Bates (1991) , who relies on conditional skewness (inferred from the option markets in his case) to measure expectations of stock market crash.
important for investment decisions and risk management. As discussed below, our study builds on prior research that attempts to predict firm-specific stock price crash risk and another stream of research that examines the relation between CSR and financial reporting transparency.
It has been well documented that the distribution of stock returns exhibits negative skewness; that is, large negative stock returns, or stock price crashes, are more common than large positive stock price movements (e.g., Chen et al., 2001; Hong and Stein, 2003) . Several studies have attempted to forecast firm-specific crash risk. One factor that emerges from the literature as a prominent predictor of stock price crash risk is the managerial tendency to withhold bad news from investors (e.g., Jin and Myers, 2006; Hutton et al., 2009 ). These studies contend that managers withhold bad news from investors due to career and compensation concerns, and when bad news accumulates and reaches a tipping point, all bad news comes out at once leading to a stock price crash. Supporting this view, empirical evidence suggests that opaque financial reporting, corporate tax avoidance, and executive equity incentives are positively associated with firm-specific crash risk, while accounting conservatism reduces such risk (Hutton et al., 2009; Kim et al., 2011a and 2011b; Kim and Zhang, 2013) .
Prior studies present different views on the implications of CSR for managers' bad news hoarding behavior and transparency in corporate financial reporting. Kim et al. (2012) find that socially responsible firms also behave responsibly in financial reporting and exhibit less evidence of earnings management, suggesting that firms' commitment to higher ethical standards has a positive impact on accounting information quality. In a similar vein, Gelb and Strawser (2001) find that firms that undertake socially responsible activities provide more financial disclosure, consistent with the notion that companies consider increased disclosure as a form of socially responsible behavior in their overall implementation of CSR practices. If firms with better CSR cultures maintain the same high level of ethical standards in financial reporting, they are likely to be associated with a higher level of transparency and are less likely to conceal bad news from investors. Thus we would expect these firms to be associated with lower stock price crash risk.
On the other hand, there is a long-standing concern that managers may use CSR opportunistically to advance their careers or other personal agenda. Friedman (1970) is among the first to express concern that CSR represents a form of agency problem within the firm. Hemingway and Maclagan (2004) argue that one motivation for companies to adopt CSR is to cover up corporate misbehavior. Enron, for example, was widely respected as a model for the CSR movement and won several national awards for its environmental and community programs while at the same time engaging in massive accounting frauds that lead to its collapse in 2001 (Bradley, 2009) . Consistent with this view, some studies find a positive relation between CSR and earnings management (Petrovits, 2006; Prior et al., 2008) . If firms use CSR as a tool to disguise bad news and divert shareholder scrutiny, CSR would be associated with higher, not lower, stock price crash risk.
To test these two opposing views of the relation between CSR and stock price crash risk, we examine how firms' CSR performance is associated with future stock price crash risk. Our CSR performance measure is based on the social ratings data provided by the MSCI ESG database. Following prior studies, we measure firm-specific crash risk by the negative skewness of firm-specific weekly returns and the asymmetric volatility of negative and positive stock returns (e.g., Chen et al., 2001) . Using a large sample of U.S. public firms from 1995 to 2009, we find a significantly negative association between firms' CSR performance and one-year-ahead stock price crash risk, suggesting that socially responsible firms have a lower future stock price crash risk. The results are robust after controlling for other predictors of future stock price crash risk identified in prior studies, including divergence of investor opinion, past returns, firm size, and accounting opaqueness. To mitigate concerns on endogeneity, we add additional control variables that may affect both CSR and crash risk, and employ the instrumental variables approach and the dynamic Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) method. Our results hold after addressing endogeneity using these tests.
In addition, we investigate whether the negative relation between CSR and future stock price crash risk is affected by the effectiveness of corporate governance and the level of institutional ownership. We find that when firms have less effective corporate governance (indicated by lower governance ratings by MSCI ESG, CEO being the chairman of the board, and lower shareholder rights based on the Gompers et al. (2003) governance index) or a lower level of long-term institutional ownership, the negative relation between CSR and future crash risk is significant. On the other hand, when firms have more effective corporate governance or a higher long-term institutional ownership, CSR does not appear to have a significant impact on crash risk. The results are consistent with the notion that the role of CSR in reducing stock price crash risk is particularly important when internal monitoring by the boards or external monitoring by institutional investors is weak. The results also address a potential concern that the negative relation between CSR and crash risk might reflect the effect of corporate governance; specifically, CSR firms may have more effective corporate governance, which in turn may limit bad news hoarding behavior and reduce stock price crash risk (Harjoto and Jo, 2011; Andreou et al., 2012) . We find that the mitigating effect of CSR on crash risk is present only for firms with weak governance, suggesting that the negative relation between CSR and crash risk is not driven by CSR firms having more effective corporate governance. Overall, the evidence in our study supports the notion that managers operating in a strong CSR-oriented corporate culture show a lower tendency to conceal bad news, leading to lower stock price crash risk.
Our study makes several contributions. First, our study adds to the growing literature on CSR and its economic consequences. As discussed earlier, much work in this area has focused on the impact of CSR on firm performance and, to a lesser extent, firm risk. We depart from these studies and focus on the unique role of CSR in reducing crash risk, which captures asymmetry in risk or the third moment of stock return distribution. This role is distinct from the effect of CSR on stock return performance (first moment) or firm risk (second moment)
documented in prior studies. Our results thus broaden our understanding of the implications of CSR on firms and investors. Our study also adds to the growing literature that examines CSR issues in the financial reporting contexts (e.g., Kim et al., 2012) .
Second, our study extends prior research that attempts to forecast future stock price crash risk (e.g., Chen et al., 2001; Hong and Stein, 2003; Jin and Myers, 2006; Hutton et al., 2009; Kim et al., 2011a and 2011b; Kim and Zhang, 2013) . Crash risk is an important characteristic of return distribution that is relevant to portfolio theories, asset-pricing, and option-pricing models. Sunder (2010) argues that crash risk cannot be mitigated through portfolio diversification, unlike the risk from symmetric volatilities. Harvey and Siddique (2000) suggest that conditional skewness is a priced factor. They find that investors command higher expected returns for stocks with more negative skewness as a reward for accepting this risk. Since crash risk captures asymmetry in risk, it is important for investment decisions and risk management. The stock market turbulence in recent years further highlights the importance of crash risk to investors. We extend prior studies by identifying a new factor that mitigates future stock price crash risk. Our study will be useful to firms and shareholders who want to manage tail risk in the stock market and to investors who want to incorporate crash risk in their portfolio and risk management decisions.
We discuss prior research in Section 2. Section 3 discusses the sample, variable measurements, and research design. Section 4 presents empirical results. Additional analysis is reported in Section 5. We conclude in Section 6.
Research issues
There are a wide variety of definitions of CSR proposed by practitioners and academics.
For example, the World Bank's International Finance Corporation (IFC) define CSR as "the commitment of businesses to contribute to sustainable economic development by working with employees, their families, the local community and society at large to improve their lives in ways that are good for business and for development." 2 Carroll (1979) defines CSR as "social responsibility of business that encompasses the economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary expectations that society has of organizations at a given point in time." Many definitions of CSR center on the notion of voluntary actions taken by firms that reflect ethical values, legal compliance, and aim at improving social or environmental conditions.
As CSR becomes increasingly important in businesses, the literature on CSR is also growing. A large number of studies examine the motives for and determinants of CSR, as well as the economic consequences of CSR. An issue that receives particular attention is whether companies that "do good" also "do better" (e.g., Roman et al., 1999; Margolis and Walsh, 2001; Jiao, 2010; Kim and Statman, 2012) . Recently a growing number of studies look beyond the link between CSR and financial performance and examine the impact of CSR in other dimensions of firm actions and outcomes, for example, firm risk (e.g., Lee and Faff, 2009 ), cost of capital (e.g.,
El Ghoul et al., 2011; Dhaliwal et al., 2011; Goss and Roberts, 2011) , and financial reporting (e.g., Gelb and Strawser, 2001; Petrovits, 2006; Prior et al., 2008; Kim et al., 2012) .
The papers that examine the relation between CSR and financial reporting transparency are closely related to our study. The debate is whether CSR activities lead to more transparent financial reporting or whether they enable managers to extract rents and are associated with a lower level of transparency. Many proponents of CSR argue that CSR activities signal a higher ethical and moral standard of managers. Managers' tendency to operate with integrity and to "do the right things" can also have a positive impact on firms' financial accounting and reporting.
Supportive of this view, Kim et al. (2012) find that socially responsible firms exhibit less evidence of both accruals-based and real-activity earnings management. Gelb and Strawser (2001) find that socially responsible firms provide more financial disclosure.
Other studies, however, take an agency-cost perspective and express a negative view on managerial motivations for pursuing CSR (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Friedman, 1970; Carroll, 1979; McWilliams et al., 2006 1995-1999 and 2003-2007) , each followed by a burst period (2000-2002 and 2008-2009, respectively) . 3 We further require financial data to be available in Compustat, and delete firms with year-end share prices below $1 or those with fewer than 26 weeks of return data so that our results are not influenced by stocks with low liquidity. Finally, we exclude firms in the regulated industries (i.e., financial and utility). 4 These data requirements yield a final sample of 12,978 firm-years from 1995 to 2009.
Corporate social responsibility measure
MSCI ESG evaluates a company's CSR based on seven qualitative categories and six exclusionary screens. The seven qualitative categories include community, corporate governance, diversity, employee relations, environment, human rights, and products. For each of these categories, MSCI ESG assigns positive and negative ratings (i.e., strengths and concerns) of the company based on a predetermined set of criteria, and the overall rating for each category is the sum of strengths minus the sum of concerns. 5 The six exclusionary screens are alcohol, gambling, firearms, military, nuclear power, and tobacco. MSCI ESG assigns only negative ratings (i.e., concerns) on these exclusionary screens.
Following prior studies (e.g., Chatterji et al., 2009; Kim et al., 2012) , our CSR measure is an aggregate CSR score to capture firm-level social responsibility based on five areas of strength/concern ratings MSCI ESG assigns to each company (CSR_SCORE). We first calculate the CSR net counts as total strengths minus total concerns in the following five categories:
community, diversity, employee relations, environment, and product. We then transform CSR net counts to create CSR_SCORE that ranges from zero to one to facilitate comparison of CSR scores across years. We use a transformation that preserves the relative distance between CSR net count for firms within the same industry (based on the Fama-French 48 industry classification) for each year using the following formula, where CSR refers to CSR net counts as defined above:
CSR_SCORE for firm i in year t = (CSR for firm i in year t -Min. CSR for firm i's industry in year t) __________________________________________________________________ (Max. CSR for firm i's industry in year t -Min. CSR for firm i's industry in year t)
We exclude the corporate governance dimension from our CSR score because it is distinct from the social and environmental dimensions represented by other categories. We also exclude human rights following prior studies (e.g., Kim et al., 2012) . Excluding the corporate governance and human rights categories from the CSR score makes our measure comparable to those in earlier studies. We examine the corporate governance and human rights categories separately in our supplemental analysis. We do not consider the exclusionary screens in our CSR score, as they do not reflect firms' discretionary implementation of CSR practices.
include investment controversies, negative economic impact, tax disputes, and other concerns. Strengths and concerns indicators for other categories are provided in Appendix B.
Crash risk measures
We employ two measures of firm-specific crash risk, following Chen et al. (2001) . 6 Both measures are based on firm-specific weekly returns estimated as the residuals from the market model. Using firm-specific returns ensures that our crash risk measures reflect firm-specific factors rather than broad market movements. Specifically, we estimate the following expanded market model regression:
where τ , j r is the return on stock j in week τ , and τ , m r is the return on the CRSP value-weighted market index in week τ . The lead and lag terms for the market index return is included to allow for nonsynchronous trading (Dimson, 1979) . The firm-specific weekly return for firm j in week
W ) is calculated as the natural logarithm of one plus the residual return from equation (1).
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Our first measure of crash risk is the negative conditional skewness of firm-specific weekly returns over the fiscal year (NCSKEW). NCSKEW is calculated by taking the negative of the third moment of firm-specific weekly returns for each year and normalizing it by the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns raised to the third power. Specifically, for each firm j in year t, NCSKEW is calculated as:
where τ , j W is firm-specific weekly return as defined above, and n is the number of weekly returns during year t. A negative sign is put in front of the third moment such that a higher value of NCSKEW indicates higher crash risk.
Our second measure of crash risk is the down-to-up volatility measure (DUVOL) of the crash likelihood. For each firm j over a fiscal-year period t, firm-specific weekly returns are separated into two groups: "down" weeks when the returns are below the annual mean, and "up" weeks when the returns are above the annual mean. Standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns is calculated separately for each of these two groups, and DUVOL is the natural logarithm of the ratio of the standard deviation in the "down" weeks to the standard deviation in the "up" weeks:
where u n and d n are the number of up and down weeks in year t, respectively. A higher value of DUVOL indicates greater crash risk. As suggested in Chen et al. (2001) , DUVOL does not involve third moments, and hence is less likely to be overly influenced by extreme weekly returns.
Empirical models
To investigate how CSR is associated with firm-specific future stock price crash risk, we estimate the following model:
where the dependent variable, CRASH_RISK, is proxied by NCSKEW or DUVOL; our primary independent variable is CSR_SCORE as discussed above. We impose a one-year lag between the dependent and independent variables to test whether CSR in year t-1 can predict crash risk in year t.
We control for several factors that have been shown to affect future stock price crash risk in prior studies. We first control for the lag value of CRASH_RISK to account for the potential serial correlation of NCSKEW or DUVOL for the sample firms. Chen et al. (2001) show that trading volume, a proxy for the intensity of differences of opinion among investors, is a predictor of stock price crash risk. We thus control for change in trading volume (DTURNOVER), calculated as the average monthly share turnover in year t minus the average monthly share turnover in t -1. In addition to trading volume, Chen et al. (2001) find that past returns also help to forecast crash risk. The predictive power of past returns can be explained by a bubble buildup as indicated by high past returns, followed by a large price drop when prices fall back to fundamentals. We thus control for past returns (RET), calculated as the mean of firm-specific weekly returns over the fiscal year. For the similar reason, we control for the market-to-book ratio (MB), as glamour stocks (those with a high MB) are also predicted to have higher crash risk.
The predictive power of firm size has been documented in several studies (e.g., Harvey and Siddique, 2000; Chen et al., 2001 ), hence we control for firm size (SIZE), calculated as the log value of the market value of equity. The next control variable is stock volatility (SIGMA), calculated as the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns over the fiscal year, as more volatile stocks are likely to be more crash prone. In addition, we control for financial leverage (LEV), calculated as total long-term debts divided by total assets, and profitability measured by return on assets (ROA). Our last control variable is abnormal accruals, a proxy for earnings management, as Hutton et al. (2009) show that earnings management is positively related to future crash risk. We measure abnormal accruals as the residuals from the modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995) , estimated by each year and each 2-digit SIC code industry. We use the absolute value of abnormal accruals (ABACC) in our regression analysis. Appendix A provides definitions of all variables used in our analysis.
We note that some of the control variables, including past returns, growth as proxied by the market-to-book ratio, firm size, profitability, and earnings management, have also been
shown to affect CSR performance in prior studies, thus providing another reason for controlling for their potential impact in our regressions. All of our regressions also include industry and year fixed effects. On average the sample firms have a 73% institutional ownership. The extent of insider transactions is measured as the net volume of trading by insiders, ranked and scaled to range between zero and one, following Rogers and Stocken (2005) . This insider trading variable has a mean of 0.707. The average number of analysts following a firm is nine. About 56% of our sample has shareholder rights data available from the RiskMetics Database, and the average GINDEX is 9.152 for this sample. The average book-tax difference, calculated as book income less taxable income scaled by lagged assets, has a mean of 0.007. As mentioned earlier, one of the qualitative categories in the MSCI ESG database is corporate governance, based on which we construct a corporate governance variable measured as total strengths minus total concerns in this category, standardized in each industry for each year. This measure has a mean value of 0.555 for our sample firms. Fifty-four percent of our sample firms have director data available from the RiskMetrics Database, and 63.7% of these firms have the CEO also serving as the chairman of the board. The average firm in our sample has a long-term institutional ownership of 55.3 percent. Table 3 reports results from regression analysis of the relation between CSR and future firm-specific crash risk after controlling for other potential determinants of crash risk. All Firms that have a higher past return, a higher market-to-book ratio, a larger firm size, a higher return volatility, and a higher ROA are associated with higher future crash risk.
Results

Descriptive statistics
The effect of CSR on crash risk
Overall, results in Table 3 suggest that socially responsible firms have a lower future stock price crash risk. The results are consistent with the notion that socially responsible firms are less likely to hoard bad news and exhibit a higher level of transparency, leading to lower future stock price crash risk.
Endogeneity
Our analysis so far suggests a negative relation between CSR and one-year-ahead crash risk. However, the potential endogenous relation between CSR and crash risk is a concern in our analysis. Endogeneity can arise due to unobservable heterogeneity when unobservable firmspecific factors affect both CSR and crash risk. In addition, while the use of lagged CSR to predict future crash risk in our research design potentially mitigates the problem of simultaneity or reverse causality, the concern of simultaneity still remains since CSR scores are quite sticky across years. We conduct several tests to mitigate these endogeneity concerns. We first include additional controls for variables that may affect both CSR and crash risk. We also employ the instrumental variables approach and the dynamic GMM method to estimate the model. Below we discuss these analyses in detail.
To mitigate concerns on omitted correlated variables, we add to the model a number of variables that can potentially affect both CSR and crash risk based on prior studies. Piotroski
and Roulstone (2004) show that the activities of financial analysts, institutional investors, and insiders affect stock price synchronicity, suggesting that these activities influence the amount of information impounded into stock prices. Ferreira and Laux (2007) we find that the coefficients on CSR_SCORE remain significantly negative for both NCSKEW and DUVOL across all twelve models presented in the table. Thus, our finding of a negative relation between CSR and future stock price crash risk is robust to including additional controls to mitigate the concern on omitted correlated variables.
We also rely on two econometric approaches to further mitigate endogeneity concerns.
The first approach is the instrumental variables method. Following prior studies (e.g., El Ghoul et al., 2011), we use the average CSR_SCORE of other firms in the same Fama-French 48 industry as the instrumental variable. We report results of the instrumental variables approach in columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 . The coefficients on the fitted value of CSR_SCORE are significantly negative for both NCSKEW and DUVOL, suggesting that the negative relation between CSR and future crash risk holds after controlling for endogeneity based on the instrumental variables methodology.
We next apply the dynamic panel GMM approach, which incorporates the dynamic relation between CSR and crash risk while accounting for other sources of endogeneity (Wintoki et al., 2012) . This method has been well developed in the economics literature and has recently been applied in corporate finance research to address potential endogeneity bias. We report results from the dynamic GMM estimation in columns (3) and (4) of Table 5 . We continue to find significantly negative coefficients on CSR_SCORE, suggesting that the negative relation between CSR and crash risk holds after controlling for endogeneity based on the dynamic GMM estimator.
The effect of corporate governance and ownership structure on the relation between CSR and crash risk
In this section we investigate whether the relation between CSR scores and future stock price crash risk varies with the level of corporate governance and ownership structure.
Corporate governance and institutional investors provide internal and external monitoring of managers, and can have two different effects on the relation between CSR and crash risk. On one hand, more effective monitoring can ensure that managers engage in socially responsible activities for genuine causes, rather than using CSR as a tool to disguise bad news. Under this scenario, we expect effective monitoring from the boards and institutional investors to strengthen the negative relation between CSR and crash risk. On the other hand, the commitment to CSR is more important in constraining earnings management when other governance mechanisms (such as monitoring by boards or institutional investors) are weak. Bae et al. (2006) show that stocks in markets that have strong corporate governance mechanisms exhibit less positive return skewness than those in markets that have poor corporate governance, and one reason is that strong corporate governance leads to better information disclosure. When strong monitoring from boards or institutional investors is present to limit bad news hoarding behavior, the incremental effect of CSR on bad news hoarding, thus crash risk, might be limited. Under this scenario, we expect the negative relation between CSR and crash risk to be more pronounced for firms with less effective corporate governance or a lower institutional ownership.
We use three measures to proxy for the effectiveness of corporate governance. The first measure is based on the MSCI ESG ratings in the corporate governance category, calculated as total strengths minus total concerns in this category, standardized in each Fama-French 48 industry for each year (GOV). The MSCI ESG strength indicators in the corporate governance category include: limited compensation to top management or board members; ownership strength (either owns or is owned by a socially responsible firm); transparency strength (effective reporting of social and environmental performance); and political accountability (responsible leadership or involvement in public policy issues). The concern indicators include weak performance in the abovementioned areas, that is, high compensation, ownership concern, transparency concern, political accountability concern, as well as a new area-accounting concern, aimed at capturing a company's involvement in significant accounting-related controversies.
The second measure is an indicator variable equal to one if the CEO also serves as the chairman of the board, and zero otherwise (CEOCHAIR) according to RiskMetrics' Directors Database. CEO-chair duality signals greater CEO power and potential entrenchment problems.
Prior studies suggest that firms with CEO-chair duality exhibit more earnings management (e.g., Dechow et al., 1996) . The third measure is the governance index (GINDEX) as developed in Gompers et al. (2003) . The governance index is a summary measure of corporate governance based on 24 firm-specific anti-takeover and charter provisions, and is widely used in the finance and accounting literature as a proxy for restrictions on shareholder rights or management entrenchment (e.g., Bates et al., 2008) .
To investigate the relation between CSR and crash risk conditional on corporate governance, we re-perform our regression analysis after partitioning the sample based on the median values of the governance variables as described above, and report the results in Table 6 .
Panel A reports the results based on the MSCI ESG governance variable (GOV). We find a significantly negative coefficient on CSR_SCORE when firms have weak governance. When firms have strong governance, however, the relation between CSR and crash risk is insignificant.
This result holds for both crash risk measures (i.e., NCSKEW and DUVOL). In Panel B, we partition the sample based on CEO-chair duality. We find that CSR_SCORE is significantly and negatively associated with crash risk (both NCSKEW and DUVOL) when the CEO also serves as the chair of the board. For firms with separate CEOs and chairs, the relation is not significant.
We report results based on GINDEX in Panel C. Consistent with results in Panels A and B, the relation between CSR and crash risk is significantly negative for firms with above-median GINDEX; that is, when firms have weak shareholder rights, but is insignificant for those with strong shareholder rights. The results are thus consistent across three governance variables and suggest that CSR is a strong predictor of future crash risk when firms have less effective corporate governance, but does not appear to have much impact on future crash risk when corporate governance is strong.
To capture the level of monitoring by long-term institutional investors, we measure the percentage of common shares owned by dedicated and quasi-indexer institutions (LTINSTI), following the classification in Bushee and Noe (2000) . 9 We partition our sample based on the median value of long-term institutional ownership and report the regression results for each partition in Panel D. The coefficients on CSR_SCORE are significantly negative when long-term institutional ownership is low, but are insignificant when long-term institutional ownership is high. This result holds for both NCSKEW and DUVOL.
Taken together, the results in Table 6 suggest that the role of CSR in mitigating managers' tendency to hide bad news and thus reducing stock price crash risk is particularly important when governance mechanisms, such as monitoring by boards or institutional investors, are weak.
Additional analysis
Domini 400 Social Index
In our main analysis, our CSR measure is based on the strength/concern ratings MSCI ESG assigns to each company. Another measure of CSR performance used in prior studies is whether a company is a member of the Domini 400 Social Index (DSI 400) (e.g., McWilliams and Siegel, 2000; Kim et al., 2012) . The DSI 400 includes companies that have strong social responsibility performance relative to their industry peers and in relation to the broader market.
MSCI ESG applies the six exclusionary screens to disqualify a company from inclusion in the index based on its industry membership (i.e., alcohol, gambling, firearms, military, nuclear power, and tobacco). In addition, to be eligible for the index, companies must meet the minimum environmental, social, and governance performance standards as determined by MSCI ESG's ratings in the seven qualitative dimensions as discussed earlier.
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We examine whether our results are robust to this alternative measure of CSR and report the results in Table 7 . The test variable is CSR_DSI400, which is an indicator variable coded as one if the company is a member of the DSI 400, and zero otherwise. As shown in columns (1) and (2), the coefficients on CSR_DSI400 are significantly negative, consistent with the results based on CSR_SCORE. One potential issue with this analysis, however, is self-selection, since the inclusion of a firm in the Domini 400 index is motivated by firm-level CSR investment. To address this concern, we employ the Heckman self-selection model and the propensity-score matching (PSM) model. 11 We continue to find negative coefficients on CSR_DSI400 from both models, as reported in columns (3) to (6) in Table 7 . Thus the negative relation between CSR_DSI400 and crash risk is robust to corrections for the self-selection problem. The results reinforce our previous findings of a negative relation between CSR_SCORE and crash risk and suggest that CSR has a mitigating effect on future stock price crash risk.
CSR strengths and concerns
Following prior studies, our CSR_SCORE variable is calculated based on total strengths minus total concerns of a firm's CSR ratings. However, strengths and concerns may capture different dimensions of a firm's CSR performance, and may have a distinct effect on future stock price crash risk. To investigate this issue, we decompose CSR_SCORE into CSR strengths and CSR concerns and re-run our analysis. 12 We find that the coefficients on CSR strengths are significantly negative, while the coefficients on CSR concerns are insignificant (results untabulated). The result is consistent for both NCSKEW and DUVOL. The result suggests that CSR strengths, rather than CSR concerns, are driving the negative relation between CSR_SCORE and future crash risk. This finding is consistent with the notion that firms' commitment to higher CSR performance contributes to lower future stock price crash risk.
CSR components
The CSR_SCORE variable used in our analysis is an aggregate measure that captures a firm's overall social performance in five qualitative categories, namely, community, diversity, employee relations, environment, and product. In this section we examine the effect of CSR score in each category on future crash risk. Individual CSR score is computed as the sum of strengths minus the sum of concerns in each of the five categories and then standardized in each industry for each year. 13 We find that the coefficient on CSR score in the environment category (CSR_ENV) in significantly negative when NCSKEW is the crash risk measure. The coefficients on CSR score in other categories (except the product category) are all negative but are insignificant (results untabulated). The results suggest that the negative relation between CSR and future stock price crash risk is mainly driven by the combined effects of CSR performance across all five categories, rather than by any single CSR category. 
Conclusions
This study examines whether CSR mitigates or contributes to future stock price crash risk.
If socially responsible firms commit to a high standard of financial reporting transparency and thus exhibit less bad news hoarding behavior, we would expect CSR to be associated with lower stock price crash risk. On the other hand, if managers engage in CSR to cover up bad news and divert shareholder attention, CSR could be associated with higher crash risk.
Our findings support the mitigating effect of CSR on crash risk. Specifically, we find a significantly negative association between firms' CSR performance and one-year-ahead stock price crash risk, after controlling for other determinants of stock price crash risk identified in prior studies, including divergence of investor opinion, past returns, firm size, and accounting opaqueness. Our results are robust to various tests intended to account for potential endogeneity, including adding additional control variables to the model and employing the instrumental variables approach and the dynamic GMM method.
In addition, we find that the mitigating effect of CSR on future crash risk is significant only when firms have less effective governance (i.e., lower corporate governance ratings by MSCI ESG, CEO being the chairman of the board, and lower shareholder rights) and a lower level of long-term institutional ownership. The results are consistent with the notion that the role of CSR in reducing crash risk is particularly important when governance mechanisms, such as monitoring by boards or institutional investors, are weak. These findings strengthen our inferences because they alleviate the concern that the negative relation between CSR and crash risk is driven by CSR firms having more effective corporate governance. Overall, the evidence the regression and find that it is not significantly related to crash risk. All other results hold after adding the human rights score.
in our study supports the notion that managers operating in a strong CSR-oriented corporate culture show a lower tendency to conceal bad news, leading to lower stock price crash risk.
Our study adds to the growing literature on CSR and its implications on firms and investors. We focus on the unique role of CSR in reducing crash risk and provide new evidence on the economic consequences of CSR. We also extend prior studies on crash risk by identifying a new factor that has an incremental mitigating effect on future stock price crash risk. Our study will be useful to firms and investors who want to manage crash risk in the stock market.
Appendix A Variable Definition
Crash risk variables:
NCSKEW is the negative skewness of firm-specific weekly returns over the fiscal year.
DUVOL is the log of the ratio of the standard deviations of down-week to up-week firm-specific weekly returns.
For both crash risk variables, the firm-specific weekly return (W) is equal to ln(1 + residual), where the residual is from the following expanded market model regression: 
CSR Variables:
CSR_SCORE is the net score of CSR rating based on the MSCI ESG data, measured as total strengths minus total concerns in five categories: community, diversity, employee relations, environment, and product, standardized in each Fama-French 48 industry for each year.
CSR_DSI400 is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if a firm is included in the Domini 400 Social Index in a given year, and zero otherwise.
Firm-level controls and conditional variables:
DTURNOVER is the average monthly share turnover over the current fiscal year minus the average monthly share turnover over the previous fiscal year, where monthly share turnover is calculated as the monthly trading volume divided by the total number of shares outstanding during the month.
RET is the mean of firm-specific weekly returns over the fiscal year, times 100.
MB is the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity.
SIZE is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity.
SIGMA is the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns over the fiscal year.
LEV is long-term debts divided by total assets.
ROA is income before extraordinary items divided by lagged total assets.
ABACC is the absolute value of discretionary accruals, where discretionary accruals are estimated from the modified Jones model. NUMEST is the number of analyst following from I/B/E/S. Table 4 presents the regression results of the effect of CSR scores on firm-level stock price crash risk after including additional controls. The twotailed p-values, based on standard errors adjusted by a two-dimensional cluster at the firm and year levels, are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. See Appendix A for variable definitions.
Appendix B CSR Concerns and Strengths in Five Qualitative
(1) Table 5 presents the analysis to address endogeniety concerns on the effect of CSR scores on firm-level stock price crash risk. Columns 1 and 2 present the results of the instrumental variable approach and Columns 3 and 4 report the results of the Dynamic Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation. The two-tailed p-values, based on standard errors adjusted by a two-dimensional cluster at the firm and year levels, are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. See Appendix A for variable definitions.
(1) Table 6 presents the regression results of subsample analysis on the effect of CSR scores on firm-level stock price crash risk. Panel A partitions the sample based on the median value of the MSCI ESG corporate governance scores, GOV, in year t-1; Panel B partitions the sample based on whether the CEO is the chairman of the board, CEOCHAIR, in year t-1; Panel C partitions the sample based on the median value of shareholder rights, GINDEX, in year t-1; and Panel D partitions the sample based on the median value of the ownership of dedicated and quasi-indexer institutions, LTINSTI, in year t-1. The two-tailed p-values, based on standard errors adjusted by a two-dimensional cluster at the firm and year levels, are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. See Appendix A for variable definitions. Table 7 presents the analysis using an alternative CSR measure, CSR_DSI400. Columns 1 and 2 report the results of the effect of CSR_DSI400 on firm-level stock price crash risk, Columns 3 and 4 report the results of the Heckman procedure, and Columns 5 and 6 report the results of the propensity-score matching (PSM) procedure. The two-tailed p-values, based on standard errors adjusted by a two-dimensional cluster at the firm and year levels, are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. See Appendix A for variable definitions.
(1) 
